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Abstract
The added worker effect (AWE) measures the entry of individuals into the labor force 
due to their partners’ adverse labor market outcomes. We propose a new method to 
calculate the AWE that allows us to estimate its effect on any labor market outcome. 
The AWE reduces the fraction of households with two non-employed members by 
16% for the 1977-2018 period; 28% in the 1990 recession and 23% during the great 
recession. The AWE also accounts for why women’s employment is much less cyclical 
and more symmetric than men’s. Without the AWE, married women’s employment would 
be as volatile as men and display negative skewness (declining quickly in recessions 
and recovering slowly in expansions). In recessions, while some women lose their 
employment, others enter the labor market and find jobs. This keeps female employment 
relatively stable.
Keywords: added worker effect, household labor supply, intra-household insurance, 
female employment, cyclicality, skewness.
JEL classification: D1, E32, J21, J22.
Resumen
Algunos trabajadores entran en el mercado laboral debido a la pérdida de empleo de 
sus cónyuges. Este fenómeno se denomina «efecto del trabajador añadido» (AWE, 
por las siglas en inglés, Added Worker Effect). En este trabajo proponemos una nueva 
metodología para calcular el AWE, que permite medir su impacto en cualquier variable 
agregada del mercado laboral. Usando datos del mercado laboral estadounidense, 
nuestros resultados indican que el AWE redujo la fracción de hogares con los dos 
miembros desempleados un 16 % en el período 1977-2018, un 28 % en la recesión de 
1990 y un 23 % durante la Gran Recesión. El AWE también explica por qué el empleo 
agregado de las mujeres es mucho menos cíclico y más simétrico que el de los hombres. 
Si no existiera el AWE, la tasa de empleo de las mujeres casadas sería tan volátil y 
asimétrica como la de los hombres (reduciéndose y recuperándose rápidamente durante 
recesiones y expansiones, respectivamente). Si bien durante las recesiones algunas 
mujeres pierden su empleo, otras entran en el mercado laboral y encuentran trabajo. 
Este mecanismo mantiene la tasa de empleo de las mujeres relativamente estable a lo 
largo del ciclo económico.
Palabras clave: efecto del trabajador añadido, oferta laboral de los hogares, seguro 
intrafamiliar, empleo femenino, ciclicidad, asimetría.
Códigos JEL: D1, E32, J21, J22.
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1 Introduction
More than 60% of the US labor force between ages 25 and 54 is married.1 The growth of
two-earner households is the result of married women’s entry into the labor market since the
1950s. While only 35% of married women between the ages 25 to 54 were in the labor force
in 1960, today, about 74% of them are.2 Hence, for a majority of workers, labor market
decisions are made jointly with a partner. Despite the growing importance of two-earner
households, the labor market outcomes are almost exclusively reported and analyzed using
individual-level data.
Married-couple households, with two potential earners, can cope with labor market shocks
better than single-person households. If one household member gets an adverse employment
or wage shock, the other member can adjust their labor supply to compensate. Typically,
the added worker effect (AWE) measures the entry of individuals into the labor force due to
their partners’ job loss. How much can households smooth shocks by adjusting their labor
supply behavior? Pruitt and Turner (2020) document that households face substantially less
earnings risk than singles. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) estimate that
only about 34% of permanent shocks to male wages and 20% of permanent shocks to female
wages are passed through to household consumption and that family labor supply is a key
insurance channel available to households. Hence, the AWE can potentially be important.
In this paper, we propose a new method to calculate the AWE. We do this using data for
the 1976-2018 period from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the main data source to
study labor market dynamics in the US. We focus on joint labor market states for couples. A
joint state can be, for example, both husband and wife being out of the labor force (OO) or the
husband being unemployed and the wife being employed (UE). There are nine such states,
which expand the standard individual labor market states of employment (E), unemployment
1The numbers are based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). For the 2000-2018 period, about 60%
of men and 62% of women were married.
2There is an extensive literature that studies the rise of married female labor force participation. See
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(U) and out-of-the-labor-force (O) states.
We calculate monthly transitions of husbands and wives a ong these nine possible labor
market outcomes, a nine-by-nine transition matrix. We then shut down transitions associated
to the AWE, and recalculate counterfactual joint labor market outcomes. For example, if
we are calculating the AWE for women, we ignore transitions like EO to UE or UO to UE,
which i icate that the husband looses his job (moves E to U) or stays unemployed (U to U),
and h wife enters the abor forc and finds a job (moves from O to E). H nce, our definition
of the AWE considers the entry of women to labor force both due their husbands job loss
and continuing unemployment.
Once we have counterfactual joint labor market outcomes for couples, we can reconstruct
any labor market statistics for households or individuals. The approach combines the in-
sight by Lundberg (1985) that the joint labor market transitions are essential to understand
the AWE with the methodology by Shimer (2012) that calculates counterfactual labor mar-
ket outcomes by eliminating fluctuations in particular transition(s). While Shimer (2012)
replaces particular transitions with their sample mean, we set them to zero.
We find that the AWE increases the labor force participation of married women by about
2.64 percentage points for the period we study (the average labor force participation for
women was 70.3%). Moreover, the AWE has been increasing. For the 2010-2017 period, the
increase in female labor force participation due to the AWE is 2.87 percentage points (the
average was 72.6%). We then look at how household and individual labor market outcomes
would be without the AWE. For households, we focus on the fraction with two non-employed
members. In the data, such households are about 3.32% of all households in the economy.
In the recent recession, the number increased to around 5%. We find that in the absence of
the AWE, the number of such households, on average, would be 3.72%, 0.4 percentage points
larger, and would have increased to 5.55% in the recent recession.
We then ask whether the AWE affects individual labor market outcomes. We document
two facts on the cyclical movements in the employment for men and women. The first fact
3
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is well known. Women’s employment is less cyclical (see Doepke and Tertilt (2016), Fukui,
Nakamura, and Steinsson (2018), and Albanesi (2019)). The second fact is novel. We show
that men’s employment shows negative skewness, i.e., they experience more significant drops
in employment during recessions, followed by slow recoveries in expansions. This is also how
aggregate employment behaves, as documented by Ferraro (2018). Women’s employment, on
the other hand, is much more symmetric across booms and recessions, exhibiting a sine-like
pattern. We find that without the AWE, fluctuations in women’s employment look like men’s;
they would have higher volatility and negative skewness. This happens because women who
enter the labor force during recessions move mainly into employment. As a result, while some
women lose their employment in a recession, others enter the labor force, find jobs, and keep
the employment rate relatively stable. We show that these findings are robust to changes in
the demographic composition of married couples during this period.
The paper is related to four strands of literature. First, the paper builds on the empirical
literature on the AWE. Lundberg (1985), Stephens (2002), Juhn and Potter (2007), Halla,
Schmieder, and Weber (2018), and Bredtmann, Otten, and Rulff (2018), are examples from
this literature. While these papers exclusively focus on how women’s labor force participation
respond to job loss by their husbands, our method allows us to study the impact of the AWE
on a wider set of labor market outcomes. Within this literature, Mankart and Oikonomou
(2016) document that added worker effect has been growing in recent decades. Second, our
paper is related to the recent macroeconomics literature that builds models with two-earner
households to study how households smooth idiosyncratic income shocks. Ortigueira and
Siassi (2013), Birinci (2019), Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2020), and Wu and Krueger
(2021) are examples in this literature. Following Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012) and
Flabbi and Mabli (2018), a set of papers within this literature model joint search behavior of
husbands and wives was developed, e.g. Mankart and Oikonomou (2017), Pilossoph and Wee
(Forthcoming), Wang (2019), Choi and Valladares-Esteban (2020), García-Pérez and Rendon
(2020). Our work is also related to the papers that show that labor market fluctuations differ
4
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by gender and the implications of these differences for the aggregate economy, e.g., Albanesi
and Şahin (2018), Fukui, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2018), Albanesi (2019), Ellieroth (2019),
and Coskun and Dalgic (2020). We highlight one potential factor, the AWE, that can generate
gender differences in labor market fluctuations. Finally, at the methodological level, we build
on the empirical literature on labor market fluctuations, e.g. Blanchard, Diamond, Hall,
and Murphy (1990), Fujita and Ramey (2009), Shimer (2012), and Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin
(2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and
introduce key concepts. Section 3 presents joint transitions. In Section 4 we calculate the
AWE and in Section 5 we study its impact on household and individual labor market stocks.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 Data
We use monthly data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS. Every household
(address) that enters the CPS is interviewed for four consecutive months, then is not inter-
viewed (rotated out) for the next eight months, and interviewed again (rotated in) for four
more months. This procedure implies that each month eight rotation groups are surveyed,
and six of these eight groups will be surveyed again next month. As a result, it is possible
to follow 3/4 of individuals and match their information between two consecutive months.
We follow a standard matching procedure, specified in Shimer (2012), based on matching
households with the same identification code, as long as household members’ characteristics
(age, sex, race and education) are consistent between two consecutive months.
Our final sample spans from February 1976 until August 2018. We use the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter to determine trend and cyclical components of labor market stocks.
Whenever we use HP filter, we present the results for the period of 1977:Q1 to 2017:Q3,
disregarding the first 5 and last 5 quarters.3 We restrict the sample to all couples who report
3We do this to avoid the end-point problems associated with the HP-filter; see Giorno, Richardson,
5
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to be married and living in the same household and also report that one of the two members
of the couple is the head. To minimize the effects of schooling and retirement decisions,
the sample is restricted to couples in which both members are 25 to 54 years old. These
restrictions result in sample of about 12,000 couples per month.
W extend the standard concepts of individual labor market states, employment (E),
unemployment (U), and non-participation (O), to couples and consider nine ifferent labor
arket states: both employed, husband employed/wife unemployed, husband employed/wife
non-participant, etc. We label these states using two letters. The first letter refers to the
labor market status of the husband and the second letter refers to the labor market status
of the wife. For example, UO codes a couple in which the husband is unemployed (U) and
the wife is non-participant (O). Any couple can be in 9 different joint labor market states
(EE, EU , EO, UE, UU , UO, OE, OU , and OO). We exploit the fact that we can link data
over consecutive months to compute the flows of couples that transit form one labor market
state to another, i.e., the number of couples who transit from state ij to state kl between
any consecutive months t and t + 1 over the number of couples in state ij in month t.
We make two adjustments, that are standard in the literature, to the raw flows. First,
following Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015), we correct for classification errors by identifying
and correcting streams of individual labor market states with unlikely reversals between
unemployment and non-participation. Consider, for example, an individual who is recorded
to be out of the labor force for two consecutive months, then appears as unemployed in
the third month, and is recorded again as out of the labor force in the fourth month. The
recording in the third month is attributed to measurement error and the individual is re-
coded as out of the labor force in that month. Second, we correct for time aggregation
bias. The CPS surveys the US population once a month. As a result, transitions that
occur between two consecutive surveys are not accounted for in measured flows. To correct
for this bias, we follow Shimer (2012), and map the discrete flows into their continuous-time
Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995).
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transition probabilities.4 Finally, we seasonally adjust each monthly series using a 12-months
moving average. However, to better visualize the data, we aggregate monthly observations
into quarters.5
After adjusting for classification errors and time-aggregation bias, we construct Markov
transition matrices for each month in our sample. We denote these 9×9 matrices by Πt.
The probability that a couple who is in state ij in a given month t transits to state kl the
following month t+1, an element of Πt, is denoted by πij,kl. Hence, πEO,EE is the probability
that a couple is in state EO (the husband is employed and the wife is non-participant) in
period t and transits to state EE (both employed) in period t + 1. We use a similar notation
to refer to the individual transitions, πMij and πWij , of men (M) and women (W ), respectively.
Finally, we use πMij|kl and πWij|kl to denote an individual transition from i to j conditional on
the spouse transiting from k to l. For example, πWOU |EU is the probability that a woman
transits from O to U , conditional on the husband moving from E to U .
3 Joint Transitions
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Men (women) are less (more) likely to transit out of labor force, independently of the tran-
sitions of their spouse:
πMiO|kl ≤ πWiO|kl for all i, k, l.
In Table 1 we also see that household members coordinate their labor supply decisions.
First, we observe the added-worker effect, that is, the increase in labor force participation
in response to the unemployment of the spouse. An out-of-the-labor-force female whose
husband loses his job, i.e., moves from employment to unemployment, is twice as likely to
enter the labor force, either as employed (6.38%) or unemployed (7.58%), than an out-of-
the-labor-force female whose husband keeps his job (4.91% and 2.16%):
πWOU |EU + πWOE|EU ≥ πWOU |EE + πWOE|EE.
Similarly, an out-of-the-labor force husband, whose wife transits from employment to un-
employment, enters the labor market as employed with a probability of 10.92% and as un-
employed with probability of 11.26% . This is about twice as large as if his wife remains
employed (8.40% and 5.46%):
πMOU |EU + πMOE|EU ≥ πMOU |EE + πMOE|EE.
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Table 1: Conditional Labor Market Transitions of Married Couples
Mal employed Male unemployed Male OLF
Female transitions E U O E U O E U O
Male employed
E 96.52 0.96 2.52 91.47 5.24 3.29 81.90 2.63 15.56
U 32.81 41.96 25.24 25.05 54.33 20.63 34.84 37.96 37.85
O 4.91 2.16 92.93 6.38 7.58 86.04 9.91 3.38 86.71
Male unemployed
E 94.60 2.38 3.02 96.30 1.99 1.71 94.17 3.32 2.52
U 47.09 31.95 25.48 19.41 64.21 16.38 30.32 38.42 45.30
O 6.02 4.86 89.12 3.66 6.92 89.42 3.62 5.25 91.12
Male OLF
E 90.93 2.15 7.00 94.55 3.78 2.03 96.41 1.34 2.25
U 28.77 50.66 32.02 13.73 60.69 25.58 25.15 48.99 25.86
O 25.32 6.31 68.37 6.02 15.06 79.24 2.69 1.85 95.46
Female employed Female unemployed Female OLF
Male Transitions E U O E U O E U O
F male employed
E 98.61 0.96 0.43 92.57 6.47 1.17 95.13 1.58 3.29
U 31.69 59.66 8.65 31.83 59.67 8.50 49.52 42.03 12.80
O 8.40 5.46 86.14 10.92 11.26 78.38 21.58 5.85 72.57
Female unemployed
E 96.89 2.30 0.84 96.93 2.50 0.57 96.74 2.41 0.90
U 47.60 43.24 8.90 21.30 73.99 4.71 30.03 53.06 19.98
O 12.23 9.26 78.51 6.29 7.25 86.46 8.87 8.84 82.29
Female OLF
E 96.44 1.77 1.79 95.85 3.57 0.59 98.37 1.06 0.57
U 46.96 43.93 13.76 21.57 71.77 6.67 35.34 54.68 9.98
O 54.20 7.96 39.56 12.39 21.60 66.67 6.94 3.79 89.27
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The upper panel shows the transition
robability of wives across E–Employment, U–Unemployment, and O–N -participation condit al n
her husband’s transition from the state in the row to the state in the column. The lower panel shows
the same for males. Estimates are adjusted for classificatio errors, time aggregation, and seasonality
(12-months moving average).
Second, we observe joint movers. The co ditional probability of particular transition is
th highest if one’s partner lso experiences th same transition. H nce, for any transition
ij:
πWij|ij ≥ πWij|kl and πMij|ij ≥ πMij|kl for all k, l.
Conside what happens to a woman whose hu band transits from mploym nt to unemploy-
ment (E to U). The probability that the wife also transits from employment to unemploy ent
is 5.24%. This probability is larger than the corresponding E to U probability for any other
transition of the man. If the husband stays on the job, for example, this probability is just
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Second, we observe joint movers. The conditional probability of a particular transition is
the highest if one’s partner also experiences the same transition. Hence, for any transition
ij:
πWij|ij ≥ πWij|kl and πMij|ij ≥ πMij|kl for all k, l.
Consider what happens to a woman whose husband transits from employment to unemploy-
ment (E to U). The probability that the wife also transits from employment to unemployment
is 5.24%. This probability is larger than the corresponding E to U probability for any other
transition of the man. If the husband stays on the job, for example, this probability is just
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around 1%, and it is 3.78% when the husband moves from O to U . This 5.24% probability
is also 5 times higher than the unconditional probability of females transiting from E to U
(1.05%). We observe a similar pattern for husbands. The probability of a husband to move
from E to U is the highest when his wife also moves from E to U .
The AWE and joint moves can have opposite effects on female employment. In a re-
cession, for example, the AWE mitigates the decline in female employment. Women whose
husbands lost their jobs enter the labor force, and some of them find jobs. On the other
hand, others whose husbands become unemployed might choose to move from employment
to unemployment. Such joint moves can be triggered, for example, by joint search in different
labor markets. In contrast to the AWE, these joint moves will lower the aggregate female
employment.
4 The Added Worker Effect
In this section, we propose a new way to measure added worker effect. We follow Lundberg
(1985), and focus on joint transitions. Consider those transitions in which one partner moves
from employment to unemployment or remains unemployed, and the other partner enters
the labor force and becomes employed or unemployed. If the wife is the one entering the
labor force, these transitions are: EO to UE, UO to UE, EO to UU , and UO to UU . If the
husband is the added worker, the relevant transitions are: OE to EU , OU to EU , OE to
UU , and OU to UU . Each of these moves represents the entry of a partner to the labor force
to mitigate the other partner’s negative labor market outcomes. The partner that enters the
labor force is either looking for a job, a movement from O to U , or has already found one,
a move from O to E. We measure the added worker effect as the change in labor market
outcomes that results when these transition probabilities are set to zero.
To compute the effect of the added worker effect on the labor market states, we build
on the methodology in Shimer (2012). In calculating the effects of the AWE, we focus on
10
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unemployment, (U/L), employment, (E/P ) and participation (L/P ) rates where L is the
total labor force, L = E + U , and P is total population, P = L + O.
First, for each month in our sample, we use the matrix of joint transition probabilities
calculated from the data, Πt to compute the steady state distribution over the 9 joint labor
market stocks associated to these transitions. Let sij be the fraction of couples in state ij at
time t. Between t and t + 1, some couples move from other states to ij, while some couples
















Given that we compute the transition probabilities πij,kl from the data, Equation 1 is a system
of 9 equations and 9 unknown sij values. If the sij values computed from equation (1) are
close to the ones in the data, Equation (1) provides a natural way to calculate the AWE,
since we can replace any πkl,ij value with an alternative and recalculate sij values.7
In the second step, we replace all the AWE transitions with the transitions in which
women (or men) do not react to their partners’ job loss or continuing unemployment. To
calculate the AWE for women, for example, we set:
πnoAW EEO,UE = πnoAW EUO,UE = πnoAW EEO,UU = πnoAW EUO,UU = 0,
and add then transitions to
πnoAW EEO,UO = πEO,UO + πEO,UE + πEO,UU ,
and
πnoAW EUO,UO = πUO,UO + πUO,UE + πUO,UU .
7Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1 shows the data on joint stocks together with the stocks implied by Equa-
tion (1).
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We recalculate joint outcomes for this counterfactual economy from equation (1), and
denote them by snoAW Eij . Then, we can aggregate sij and snoAW Eij into individual labor market
stocks (E, U , and P ) and (EnoAW E, UnoAW E, and P noAW E), and calculate the differences.
The procedure is flexible and can be used to compute how the added worker affects any other
labor market outcome.
The existing measures of the AWE focus exclusively on the entry of women into the labor
force which is associated to the job loss of their husbands. Our method can be used to
compute not only the change in participation, but also how the added worker affects any
other labor market outcome.
Table 2 documents the contribution of the added worker effect. For the entire period
(1977-2017), the added worker effect increases female labor force participation by about 2.64
percentage points. Most of this increase is due to higher employment. Without the AWE,
the employment rate of married women would be 2.42 percentage points lower. Moreover,
the importance of the AWE has been increasing in recent decades. For the 2000-2010 and
2010-2017 periods, the labor force participation rates of women are higher by 3.08 and 2.87
percentage points, respectively. The effect of the added workers on unemployment is not
negligible either. In the absence of the added worker effect, the female unemployment rate
would be about 0.21 percentage points lower for the 2010-2017 period (the unemployment
12
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the importance of the AWE has been increasing in recent decades. For the 2000-2010 and
2010-2017 periods, the labor force participation rates of women are higher by 3.08 and 2.87
percentage points, respectively. The effect of the added workers on unemployment is not
negligible either. In the absence of the added worker effect, the female unemployment rate
would be about 0.21 percentage points lower for the 2010-2017 period (the unemployment
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rate of women during this period was 4.03%).8
Table 2: Added Worker Effect, Individuals
1977-2017 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2017
All
Participation Rate 1.82 1.70 1.69 2.11 2.07
Employment Rate 1.68 1.63 1.65 1.98 1.73
Unemployment Rate 0.11 0.05 -0.00 0.08 0.30
Males
Participation Rate 0.98 0.71 1.00 1.18 1.25
Employment Rate 0.96 0.90 1.05 1.14 0.94
Unemployment Rate -0.01 -0.22 -0.08 0.00 0.28
Females
Participation Rate 2.64 2.64 2.30 3.08 2.87
Employment Rate 2.42 2.34 2.20 2.91 2.59
Unemployment Rate 0.18 0.29 0.04 0.08 0.21
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent
differences between the means of the data and the counterfactual experiment calculations (in which the
added worker effect is shut down) in percentage points, for different time periods. In the upper panel
we shut down all transitions mentioned above (the added worker effect for males and females). In the
middle panel we shut down transitions corresponding to males’ added worker effect: OE to EU , OU to
EU , OE to UU , and OU to UU . In the lower panel we shut down the joint transitions, corresponding
to females’ added worker effect: EO to UE, UO to UE, EO to UU , and UO to UU .
Although the existing papers on the AWE concentrate on how much the labor force
participation of wives changes as a result of their husbands’ job loss, our analysis reveals that
there also exists a small added-worker effect for husbands, which has also been increasing in
recent decades. For the 2010-2017 period, due to the AWE, the participation of men increases
by 1.25 percentage points (the participation rate of men during this period was 93.61%).
While for women almost all the increase in participation is absorbed by employment, for
men about 22% of the increase in labor force participation results in higher unemployment.9
8Figure B.2 in Appendix B presents the AWE as the difference between the data and the counterfactual
series for unemployment, employment, and participation rates.
9Table B.1 in Appendix B presents the effects of the AWE during recessions and expansions. The AWE
is slightly more important for employment during recessions, while it is more important for unemployment
in expansions. For unemployment, male’s added worker effect is negative during recessions. This happens
due to the fact that less women lose their jobs during recessions and men are still more likely to be employed
than women. As a result, men enter unemployment mostly from employment, not from non-participation.
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4.1 Robustness
The results are robust to alternative ways of calculating the AWE. First, the existing papers
on the AWE concentrate on how much the labor force participation of wives changes due to
their husbands’ job loss, i.e., focus on EO to UE and EO to UE moves. This is a more
conservative measure than ours since we also consider UO to UE and UO to UU move-
ments where wives enter the labor force due to their husbands’ continuing unemployment.
We present the results that exclusively focus on job losses of partners in Appendix C. Not
surprisingly, the AWE has a smaller impact on the female labor force participation with this
calculation (1.78 vs. 2.64).
Second, in our calculations, we replace the AWE transitions with zero and assume that
the wife (or husband) stays in her (or his) state. For example, πEO,UE is set to zero, and this
probability is added to πEO,UO. An alternative would be to replace πEO,UE not with zero but
with πEO,EE. This alternative assumes that some women move from O to E even if their
husbands stay employed and transitions beyond that are considered as part of the AWE. The
results with this alternative specification are presented in Appendix D. The AWE increases
the married female labor force participation by 2.12, instead of 2.64.
Finally, during the 1976-2018 period, the US population has changed along several di-
mensions, such as educational attainment, age, state of residence, race, and the presence of
children. We recalculate the AWE, assuming that the population’s demographic composition
did not change since the 1976-1979 period. We find that among these demographic character-
istics, only educational attainment had a significant impact on the labor market outcomes. If
the share of the population with a college degree remained in its 1976-1979 value, the impact
of the AWE on female labor force participation would be even higher, 3.26 percentage point,
instead of 2.64. The changes in the number of children have a similar effect. The detailed
results are presented in Appendix E.
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While for women almost all the increase in participation is absorbed by employment, for
men about 22% of the increase in labor force participation results in higher unemployment.9
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series for unemployment, employment, and participation rates.
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due to the fact that less women lose their jobs during recessions and men are still more likely to be employed
than women. As a result, men enter unemployment mostly from employment, not from non-participation.
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5 Why does the AWE Matter?
In this section, we study how the AWE affects the labor market stocks of households and
individuals. We start with households. Since 1976, US households have changed dramatically.
There has been a significant decline in the number of traditional households who are in the
EO state with a breadwinner husband and a housekeeper wife. In 1976, about 45% of
households had an employed husband and an out-of-labor-force wife. By the end of the
sample in 2018, less than 25% of married couples consist of such traditional households. As
women entered the labor force, these traditional households were replaced by households
in which both members work. The fraction of such households increased by more than 20
percentage points, from 44% to 67%, between 1976 and 2018. The increase was remarkable
until the late 1990s. Since then, the fraction of households with two employed individuals
declined slightly, from about 69% to 67%. The decline was matched with an increase in
households in which men are out of the labor force (OE, OU and OO states) and coincides
with the decline in aggregate labor force participation.10 There has also been an increase
in the number of households where the traditional roles of husbands and wives are reversed.
The fraction of such households, where the husband is out of the labor force and the wife is
employed increased from 1.68% to 3.55% between 1976 and 2018.
These changes imply that for a majority of workers labor market decisions are not made
in isolation, but together with a partner. Yet, the labor market stocks are almost exclusively
reported and analyzed using individual-level data. While the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) reports employment characteristics of families, e.g., fraction of families with at least
one employed or at least one unemployed member, these statistics do not receive much
attention.11
The AWE allows households to smooth adverse labor market shocks. When one partner
loses their job, the other enters the labor market so that at least one member has a job. As
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a result, the fraction of households with “two non-employed members” is a natural metric
to evaluate the impact of the AWE. The solid line in Figure 1a shows the fraction of such
households, i.e., households in states UU , UO, OU , and OO. Between 1976 and 2018, 3.32%
of all married households have two non-employed members. In the recent recession, the
number was close to 5%. The dashed line in Figure 1a shows what would be the fraction
of such households without AWE. The average share of households with both members non-
employed in the absence of the AWE is about 3.72%. Hence, without the AWE, the fraction
of households without any employed members would be 0.4 percentage points higher. This
is about 16% of households without any employed members. We see this measure as a
conservative indicator of how the AWE helps households to smooth shocks since it abstracts
from adjustments along the intensive margin.12
Figure 1: Added Worker Effect, Households
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Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. In the panel 1a, the solid line represents
the share of households with two non-employed members. The dashed line represent the results of
counterfactual experiments in which we shut down added-worker effect in the economy. In the panel
1b, the solid line represents cyclical component of men’s employment, the dashed line represents the
cyclical component of women’s employment, and the dotted line represents the cyclical component of
the counterfactual women’s employment rate in the economy with the added worker effect shut down.
Monthly series smoothed using a 12-month moving average, adjusted for classification errors, corrected
for time aggregation bias, HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter 1600 and presented averaged across
quarters. Grey areas represent NBER recession periods.
12The results in Figure1 are robust to different specifications we consider in section 4.1. See Appendix C,
D and E.
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5.1 Individuals: Women vs. Men
In this section, we study how the AWE affects individual labor market stocks. We focus
on employment and document two key differences between men and women with respect to
the cyclicality of employment. The first fact is well known: women’s employment is much
less cyclical.13 Figure 1b shows the cyclical component of employment for men and women,
where the trend is filtered using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter 1600.
Following Doepke and Tertilt (2016), we distinguish between two measures of volatility:
(i) Total volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of a variable;
(ii) Cyclical volatility, measured as the standard deviation of a predicted variable obtained
from regressing the cyclical part of that variable on the real GDP’s cyclical component. As
an alternative measure of cyclical volatility, we also report the ratio of the standard deviation
of the cyclical component of a series to that of real GDP. The first column in Table 3 shows
the total volatility of participation, employment, and unemployment, for males and females,
while the second and third columns report cyclical volatility. Female employment is much
less volatile than male employment (0.43 vs. 0.64). The differences in cyclical volatility in
columns 2 is even larger, 0.25 vs. 0.48 .
Next, we show that men and women also differ in the asymmetry (or skewness) of their
employment fluctuations. For asymmetry, we follow Sichel (1993) and Ferraro (2018) and
report two measures. The first is the skewness in levels, which measures the asymmetry of
the cyclical component of a series. If a series has zero skewness in levels, then it goes up and
down in a symmetric manner in recessions and expansions, generating a sine-like pattern,
with the same magnitudes of peaks and troughs. The second measure is the skewness in
growth rates, which measures the asymmetry in the behavior og growth rates. If a series has
zero skewness in growth rates, expansions and recessions are associated with similar growth
13See Fukui, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2018) and Albanesi (2019).
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Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. In the panel 1a, the solid line represents
the share of households with two non-employed members. The dashed line represent the results of
counterfactual experiments in which we shut down added-worker effect in the economy. In the panel
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12The results in Figure1 are robust to different specifications we consider in section 4.1. See Appendix C,
D and E.
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5.1 Individuals: Women vs. Men
In this section, we study how the AWE affects individual labor market stocks. We focus
on employment and document two key differences between men and women with respect to
the cyclicality of employment. The first fact is well known: women’s employment is much
less cyclical.13 Figure 1b shows the cyclical component of employment for men and women,
where the trend is filtered using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter 1600.
Following Doepke and Tertilt (2016), we distinguish between two measures of volatility:
(i) Total volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of a variable;
(ii) Cyclical volatility, measured as the standard deviation of a predicted variable obtained
from regressing the cyclical part of that variable on the real GDP’s cyclical component. As
an alternative measure of cyclical volatility, we also report the ratio of the standard deviation
of the cyclical component of a series to that of real GDP. The first column in Table 3 shows
the total volatility of participation, employment, and unemployment, for males and females,
while the second and third columns report cyclical volatility. Female employment is much
less volatile than male employment (0.43 vs. 0.64). The differences in cyclical volatility in
columns 2 is even larger, 0.25 vs. 0.48 .
Next, we show that men and women also differ in the asymmetry (or skewness) of their
employment fluctuations. For asymmetry, we follow Sichel (1993) and Ferraro (2018) and
report two measures. The first is the skewness in levels, which measures the asymmetry of
the cyclical component of a series. If a series has zero skewness in levels, then it goes up and
down in a symmetric manner in recessions and expansions, generating a sine-like pattern,
with the same magnitudes of peaks and troughs. The second measure is the skewness in
growth rates, which measures the asymmetry in the behavior og growth rates. If a series has
zero skewness in growth rates, expansions and recessions are associated with similar growth
13See Fukui, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2018) and Albanesi (2019).
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rates of the opposite sign. For both measures, the skewness of a series is measured by the
coefficient of skewness, given by skew(x) = E[(xt − E[xt])3]/σ3x.
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the results (p-values are reported in brackets). Em-
ployment is negatively skewed for men (skewness in levels is -0.60 and skewness in growth
rate is -1.21). Hence men experience more significant drops in employment during recessions,
followed by slow recoveries in expansions. The aggregate employment also shows negative
skewness, that is the fact documented by Ferraro (2018). This is, however, not the case for
women. Women’ employment behavior is symmetric in levels (skewness is, basically, zero).
In terms of skewness in growth rates, women’s employment grows marginally faster than
it falls (skewness in growth rates is 0.4). Unemployment displays positive skewness in levels,
i.e., peaks in recessions are larger than troughs during expansions. The skewness in levels is,
however, almost twice as high for men as it is for women (0.81 vs. 0.49). The pattern also
emerges in growth rates (1.33 vs. 0.64). If we look at the participation rate for men and
women, the troughs and peaks in levels are symmetric. However, the participation of women
grows faster in recessions than it falls in expansions (steepness skewness is 0.4).
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the cyclical properties of employment without the
AWE. In the absence of the AWE, women’s employment is similar to men’s: both in terms
of volatility and skewness (see also Figure 1b). The AWE has almost no effects on the
volatility of men’s employment. In contrast, without the AWE, the volatility of women’s
employment is much higher than in the data (0.71 vs. 0.43) and close to the volatility of
men’s employment. The AWE also has a significant impact on the skewness of women’s
employment. In a world without the AWE, the cyclical behavior of women’s employment
would look like men’s employment, with significant and fast declines in recessions and slow
recoveries in expansions. The skewness would be negative both in deepness (-0.30) and in
steepness (-0.41).14
14The results in Table 3 are robust to different specifications we consider in section 4.1. See Appendix C,
D and E.
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Table 3: Added Worker Effect, Volatility and Skewness
Cyclical Skewness Skewness
Volatility Volatility SD/SDGDP in levels in growth rates
Men
Participation 0.11 0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.18
[0.516] [ 0.338 ]
Employment 0.64 0.48 0.41 -0.61 -1.21
[0.002] [ 0.000 ]
Unemployment 0.62 0.48 0.40 0.81 1.33
[0.000] [ 0.000 ]
Women
Participation 0.24 0.02 0.16 -0.07 0.40
[0.717] [ 0.036 ]
Employment 0.43 0.25 0.27 -0.09 0.40
[0.634] [ 0.038 ]
Unemployment 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.49 0.64
[0.012] [ 0.001 ]
Without the added-worker effect
Women
Participation 0.56 0.15 0.36 0.07 -0.35
[0.709] [ 0.066 ]
Employment 0.71 0.34 0.45 -0.30 -0.41
[0.108] [ 0.033 ]
Unemployment 0.42 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.58
[0.155] [ 0.003 ]
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent
standard deviations of the cyclical component, standard deviation of the predicted values of labor market
states from the regression of cyclical component of labor state on cyclical component of log-GDP, ratios
of standard deviations of the cyclical component of labor market state and cyclical component of GDP,
skewness of cyclical component after HP-filtering ("in levels"), and skewness of the growth rates in the
data and in the counterfactual steady state of the economy without an added-worker effect. P-values
in brackets.
Why does women’s employment without the AWE look like men’s employment? This
happens as women who enter the labor force during recessions move mainly into employment.
As a result, as some women lose their employment in a recession, others enter the labor force,
find jobs, and keep the employment rate relatively stable. This is further highlighted in Figure
2, which shows O to E and O to U transitions for men and women. First, while O to E
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transition declines for men in each recession, O to E transition remains relatively stable for
women, except in the recent downturn. Indeed such transitions increased for women in the
1990 recession. Furthermore, O to U transitions, which increase significantly for men in each
recession, are also much more stable for women.
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Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. Adjusted for classification errors and time
aggregation bias. Seasonally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Quarterly average of monthly
data. Each transition is denoted X − Y , where X corresponds to the state in period t and Y – to the
state in period t+1. X and Y can stand for: E– Employment, U–Unemployment, O–Non-participation.
Grey areas represent NBER recession periods.
6 Conclusions
We propose a new method to measure the added worker effect based on the joint transitions
of married households across labor market states. The method offers a transparent procedure
to assess the importance of the added worker effect on any labor market outcome.
We document two key facts. First, the share of households in which both members are
non-employed would be, on average, around 16% higher in the absence of the added worker
effect. This measure is indicative of one of the dimensions in which the added worker effect
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provides insurance against negative labor market shocks. Second, we show that the differences
in the cyclicality of employment between married men and women, both in terms of volatility
and skewness, are driven by the added worker effect. In the absence of the added worker
effect, the employment of married women would be as volatile as that of men and display
negative skewness (declining sharply in recessions and recover slowly in expansions).
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Online Appendix
Appendix A: Data
A.1 Data Correction Details
A.1.1 Classification Errors
In this section of the Appendix, we provide details on adjustments for classification errors
and time aggregation bias. Classification errors occur due to erroneous codification and/or
misclassification of workers who are unemployed or out of the labor force. Abowd and Zellner
(1985) and Poterba and Summers (1986) document that the measured transitions between
unemployment and out of the labor force can be affected by such classification errors. In order
to address this issue, we use the methodology proposed by Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015)
which identifies and corrects streams of labor market states with unlikely reversals between
unemployment and non-participation. As an example, consider an individual who is recorded
to be out of the labor force for two consecutive months, then appears as unemployed in the
third month, and is recorded again as out of the labor force in the fourth month. Elsby,
Hobijn, and Şahin (2015) consider the recording in the third month as an error, and re-
code the state of this individual as being out of the labor force for four consecutive months.
Using this approach, we identify all reversal transitions between unemployment (U) and non-
participation (O), such as: O − U − O and U − O − U , and re-code them. In Table A.1
we report all the transitions that are re-coded. The difference between the two estimates
is not large (with the exception of the state in which both members of the household are
out of the labor force). Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015) note that this happens since there
are approximately the equal number of re-coding of unemployment into non-participation
and non-participation into unemployment and thus in cross-section these errors cancel each
other. The classification errors, however, matter more for the transitions as documented in
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Figure A.1 (men) and Figure A.2 (women).
Table A.1: Recod ng of un mp oymen – non-participation reversals
Data Correction Data Correction
OOUO OOOO UUOU UUUU
OUOO OOOO UOUU UUUU
EOUO EOOO EUOU EUUU
OUOE OOOE UOUE UUUE
.OUO .OOO .UOU .UUU
OUO. OOO. UOU. UUU.
Not Corrected
OUOU OUOU UOUO UOUO
Note: E corresponds to Employment, U–to Unemployment, O–to Non-participation.
A.1.2 Time Aggregation Bias
Time aggregation bias, which only affects transitions, is a consequence of the frequency in
which the data is collected by the CPS. The CPS surveys the US population once a month.
However, changes in labor market status can occur at any point in time between two surveys.
Hence, if more than one transitions occur between two surveys, those would not be reflected
in the raw flows. A simple example would be a worker who is employed at time t, then
loses her job, i.e., transits from employment to unemployment, and before the next survey,
finds a new job, transiting back from unemployment to employment. At time t + 1, the
worker would be recorded as being employed and, thus, her transition into unemployment
and back to employment would not be taken into account. To address this problem, we follow
Shimer (2012) and map the discrete flows (adjusted for the classification errors) into their
continuous-time transition probabilities.
Let Γt be the discrete Markov transition matrix across nine possible labor market states
that we calculate directly from the data and adjust for the classification errors, and let Πt be
its continuous-time counterpart. Since both continuous and discrete time transitions must
generate the same steady state stocks, one can infer Πt from Γt.15
15Describing the procedure below, we closely follow working paper version of Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin
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where γji denotes probability of transition from the state i to the state j, and




Taking into account that pEE + pEU + pEO + pUE + pUU + pUO + pOE + pOU + pOO = 1, we
can rewrite the system in a following way (substituting OO state):
(2015).
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where γji denotes probability of transition from the state i to the state j, and
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The analogous continuous time equation to this Markov chain is ṡt = Πtst + qt, where
qt is continuous-time version of gt. From the discrete-time version, st = Γtst−1 + gt we find
the steady state of the discrete Markov chain by st = (I − Γt)−1gt. The steady state of the
continuous time analogue is: 0 = Πtst + qt ⇒ st = −Π−1qt. Thus, steady state satisfies
st = (I − Γt)−1gt = −Π−1qt.
Now, let’s calculate deviations from the steady state ψ = (st − st). We can apply this
transformation to the discrete time equation and get st − st = Γt(st−1 − st−1), which is the
same as ψt = Γtψt−1. Analogously for continuous time we get ψ̇t = Πtψt.
The latter differential equation has a solution ψt = ΩtΛtΩ−1t ψt−1, where Ωt is a matrix
of eigenvectors of the matrix Πt, and Λt is a matrix, whose diagonal elements are equal to
the exponent of eigenvalues of the matrix Πt. It follows that Γt = ΩtΛtΩ−1t . The latter
implies that the eigenvectors of the matrix Γt are the same as those of the Πt, and that the
eigenvalues of Γt are equal to the exponentiated eigenvalues of Πt. Hence, given an estimate
of Γt that we observe from the data, we can find out matrix of continuous transitions Πt
through the eigenvalue decomposition of the matrix Γt.
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1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
TA & Recoded Recoded Raw
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. Married men aged 25-54. Dotted lines represent raw data transitions,
dashed lines represent transitions corrected for the classification error, solid lines represent transitions
adjusted for classification error and time aggregation bias. Quarterly average of monthly data. Season-
ally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Grey areas represent NBER recession periods.
In Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 we present estimates of labor market flows that are adjusted
for the time aggregation (after correction for the classification errors), together with the raw
flows and flows that are adjusted for the classification errors. The effect of time-aggregation
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bias is minimal on transitions between employment and out of labor force states. On the
other hand, for all other transitions to and from unemployment, correcting for the time
aggregation bias results in higher levels of transitions.
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1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
TA & Recoded Recoded Raw
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. Married women aged 25-54. Dotted lines represent raw data tran-
sitions, dashed lines represent transitions corrected for the classification error, solid lines represent
transitions adjusted for classification error and time aggregation bias. Quarterly average of monthly
data. Seasonally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Grey areas represent NBER recession
periods.
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TA & Recoded Recoded Raw
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. Married men aged 25-54. Dotted lines represent raw data transitions,
dashed lines represent transitions corrected for the classification error, solid lines represent transitions
adjusted for classification error and time aggregation bias. Quarterly average of monthly data. Season-
ally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Grey areas represent NBER recession periods.
In Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 we present estimates of labor market flows that are adjusted
for the time aggregation (after correction for the classification errors), together with the raw
flows and flows that are adjusted for the classification errors. The effect of time-aggregation
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bias is minimal on transitions between employment and out of labor force states. On the
other hand, for all other transitions to and from unemployment, correcting for the time
aggregation bias results in higher levels of transitions.
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TA & Recoded Recoded Raw
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. Married women aged 25-54. Dotted lines represent raw data tran-
sitions, dashed lines represent transitions corrected for the classification error, solid lines represent
transitions adjusted for classification error and time aggregation bias. Quarterly average of monthly
data. Seasonally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Grey areas represent NBER recession
periods.
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A.2 Labor Market Stocks of Single, Married and All Individuals
In this subsection we show the unemployment, (U/P ), employment, (E/L) and participation
(P/L) rates for married, single, and all individuals, where P = E + U and total population
is L = P + O.
Figure A.3: Labor Market Stocks of Single, Married and All Individuals
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Married Single All
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. Quarterly averages of monthly data.
Seasonally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Adjusted for classification errors. The solid
line represents married individuals, dashed line - all population. Grey areas represent NBER recession
periods.
A.3 Joint Labor Market Transitions of Married Couples
In this appendix we document joint labor market transitions of spouses across joint labor
market outcomes. Each joint labor market state is comprised of two letters, first corresponds
to husband, second corresponds to wife. E is employed, U - uenmployed, O - out-of-the labor
force. Thus, EU stands for an employed husband and an unemployed wife. Each number
32
corresponds to a probability of a couple of transiting from the state on the lines to the state
in columns.
Table A.2: Joint Average Labor Market Transitions of Married Couples
EE EU EO UE UU UO OE OU OO
EE 95.00 0.96 2.52 0.95 0.04 0.02 0.43 0.01 0.06
EU 32.43 38.42 24.86 0.47 2.38 0.39 0.25 0.55 0.24
4.89 2.17 91.14 0.04 0.04 1.07 0.06 0.01 0.57
UE 31.38 0.54 0.53 54.62 2.18 1.76 8.66 0.09 0.23
UU 6.52 21.26 3.01 18.20 26.11 15.67 1.52 4.82 2.89
UO 1.54 1.05 34.21 3.53 7.03 42.05 0.49 0.37 9.73
OE 8.34 0.12 0.46 5.49 0.13 0.10 81.75 1.37 2.24
OU 2.94 7.27 2.22 1.84 6.97 1.97 23.55 29.96 23.29
OO 1.74 0.31 6.94 0.19 0.38 3.86 2.71 1.93 81.94
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. Percentage of people transiting from the
labor state in the row to each of the labor states in columns. In each stock XY , X refers to the male
and Y to the female. X and Y can stand for: E - employed, U - unemployed, O - out of the labor force.
Adjusted for classification errors, seasonality (12-months moving average) and time aggregation bias.
Appendix B: Added Worker Effect
In Figure B.1 we present how well themethodology of Shimer (2012) allows us to approximate
the observed data. In Figure B.2 we show the evolution of the added worker effect, calculated
as a difference between the original data series and the artificial series that we calculate
using the aforementioned methodology. In Table B.1 we present the added worker effect in
recessions and expansions.
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1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Data SS approximation
Note: CPS 1976:Q1 to 2018:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. Adjusted for classification errors. Season-
ally adjusted using a 12-month moving average. Quarterly average of monthly data. Each joint stock
is denoted by two letter XY , where X refers to the male and Y to the female. X and Y can stand
for: E - employed, U - unemployed, O - out of the labor force. Solid lines represent joint labor market
stocks in the data, dashed lines correspond to steady state approximation of these stocks, implied by
the continuous time joint transitions matrix. Grey areas represent NBER recessions.
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Figure B.2: Added Worker Effect
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Added Worker Effect HP trend











1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018












1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018














1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Added Worker Effect HP trend











1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018











1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018












1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Added Worker Effect HP trend
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. Monthly series smoothed using a 12-month
moving average, adjusted for classification errors, corrected for time aggregation bias, and presented
averaged across quarters. Solid line corresponds to the size of the added worker effect, that we get by
substracting from the data counterfactual stocks with no added-worker effect. Dashed line corresponds
to the trend of the data after applying HP-filter with the smoothing factor 1600. Grey areas represent
NBER recession periods.
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Table B.1: Role of Added Worker Effect, Expansions and Recessions
Expansions
1977Q2 1980Q4 1983Q1 1991Q2 2002Q1 2009Q3 Total1979Q4 1981Q2 1987Q4 2000Q4 2007Q3 2017Q3
All
Participation Rate 1.12 1.74 1.80 1.73 1.97 2.08 1.82
Employment Rate 0.90 1.64 1.64 1.66 1.81 1.75 1.64
Unemployment Rate 0.29 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.30 0.16
Males
Participation Rate 0.44 0.61 0.76 1.03 1.06 1.24 0.98
Employment Rate 0.36 0.74 0.85 1.03 0.92 0.90 0.88
Unemployment Rate 0.08 -0.16 -0.13 -0.03 0.11 0.32 0.07
Females
Participation Rate 1.80 2.88 2.84 2.43 2.89 2.92 2.65
Employment Rate 1.45 2.55 2.42 2.29 2.69 2.60 2.39
Unemployment Rate 0.50 0.32 0.44 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.24
Recessions
1980Q1 1981Q3 1988Q1 2001Q1 2007Q4 Total1980Q3 1982Q4 1991Q1 2001Q4 2009Q2
All
Participation Rate 1.30 2.12 1.44 2.53 2.19 1.84
Employment Rate 1.18 2.14 1.49 2.50 2.18 1.85
Unemployment Rate 0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06
Males
Participation Rate 0.75 0.50 0.81 1.06 1.59 0.94
Employment Rate 0.94 0.98 1.05 1.15 1.70 1.18
Unemployment Rate -0.22 -0.52 -0.27 -0.12 -0.19 -0.28
Females
Participation Rate 1.84 3.73 2.06 3.99 2.79 2.73
Employment Rate 1.43 3.30 1.93 3.86 2.66 2.52
Unemployment Rate 0.56 0.35 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.16
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. Numbers in the table represent differences
between the means of the data and counterfactual experiment calculations (in which added worker
effect is shut down) in percentage points, for different time periods, recessions and expansions. Dates
of recessions are taken from NBER website.
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Appendix C: Added Worker Effect due to Job Loss of
Partners
The existing measures of the AWE that can be found in the literature focus exclusively on
the entry of the women into the labor force that is associated to a husband’s job loss. They
do not take into account a more prolonged effect of women entering labor force in response to
their husband staying unemployed. We use our methodology to calculate this, more common
and conservative, measure of AWE effect. We do the following modifications to the transition
















Table C.1: Added Worker Effect, Individuals
(only considering job loss by partners)
1977-2017 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2017
All
Participation Rate 1.28 1.03 1.19 1.62 1.48
Employment Rate 1.21 1.04 1.20 1.56 1.23
Unemployment Rate 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.22
Males
Participation Rate 0.76 0.51 0.78 0.97 0.95
Employment Rate 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.94 0.66
Unemployment Rate -0.02 -0.23 -0.08 0.00 0.28
Females
Participation Rate 1.78 1.53 1.58 2.28 2.00
Employment Rate 1.66 1.37 1.55 2.20 1.82
Unemployment Rate 0.09 0.15 -0.02 0.01 0.12
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent
differences between the means of the data and the counterfactual experiment calculations in percentage
points, for different time periods. In the upper panel we shut down all transitions mentioned below (the
added worker effect for males and females). In the middle panel we shut down transitions corresponding
to males’ AWE: OE to EU , OE to UU . In the lower panel we shut down the joint transitions,
corresponding to females’ AWE: EO to UE, EO to UU .
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Figure C.1: Added Worker Effect, Households
(only considering job loss by partners)
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Data (M) Data (W) No Added Worker (W)
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. In the panel C.1a, the solid line represents
the share of households with two non-employed members. The dashed line represent the results of
counterfactual experiments in which we shut down the AWE due to partner’s job loss in the economy.
In the panel C.1b, the solid line represents cyclical component of men’s employment, the dashed line
represents the cyclical component of women’s employment, and t dotted line represents the cyclical
component of the counterfactual women’s empl yment rate in the economy wi h the added worker
effect shut dow . Monthly series smoothed using a 12-month moving average, adjusted for classification
errors, cor ect d for time aggregation bias, HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter 1600 and prese ted
averaged across quarters. Grey areas represent NBER ecession periods.
This specification results in lower values of the AWE. The AWE for women’s employment
in our main specification, for example, was 2.42 p.p. in 1977-2017. It is 1.66 p.p. for this
alternative specification.
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Figure C.1: Added Worker Effect, Households
(only considering job loss by partners)
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Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. In the panel C.1a, the solid line represents
the share of households with two non-employed members. The dashed line represent the results of
counterfactual experiments in which we shut down the AWE due to partner’s job loss in the economy.
In the panel C.1b, the solid line represents cyclical component of men’s employment, the dashed line
represents the cyclical component of women’s employment, and the dotted line represents the cyclical
component of the counterfactual women’s employment rate in the economy with the added worker
effect shut down. Monthly series smoothed using a 12-month moving average, adjusted for classification
errors, corrected for time aggregation bias, HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter 1600 and presented
averaged across quarters. Grey areas represent NBER recession periods.
This specification results in lower values of the AWE. The AWE for women’s employment
in our main specification, for example, was 2.42 p.p. in 1977-2017. It is 1.66 p.p. for this
alternative specification.
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Table C.2: Added Worker Effect, Volatility and Skewness
(only considering job loss by partners)
Cyclical Skewness Skewness
Volatility Volatility SD/SDGDP in levels in growth rates
Men
Participation 0.11 0.03 0.08 -0.12 0.18
[0.516] [ 0.338 ]
Employment 0.64 0.55 0.47 -0.61 -1.21
[0.002] [ 0.000 ]
Unemployment 0.62 0.54 0.46 0.81 1.33
[0.000] [ 0.000 ]
Women
Participation 0.24 0.04 0.18 -0.07 0.40
[0.717] [ 0.036 ]
Employment 0.43 0.29 0.32 -0.09 0.40
[0.634] [ 0.038 ]
Unemployment 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.49 0.64
[0.012] [ 0.001 ]
Without the added-worker effect
Women
Participation 0.52 0.01 0.38 0.35 -0.29
[0.069] [ 0.126 ]
Employment 0.63 0.26 0.47 -0.16 -0.40
[0.391] [ 0.038 ]
Unemployment 0.46 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.60
[0.045] [ 0.003 ]
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent
standard deviations of the cyclical component, standard deviation of the predicted values of labor market
states from the regression of cyclical component of labor state on cyclical component of log-GDP, ratios
of standard deviations of the cyclical component of labor market state and cyclical component of GDP,
skewness of cyclical component after HP-filtering ("in levels"), and skewness of the growth rates in the
data and in the counterfactual steady state of the economy without an added-worker effect. P-values
in brackets.
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Appendix D: Added Worker Effect – Alternative Speci-
fication
To calculate the AWE in Section 4, we replace the AWE transitions with zero and assume
that the wife (or husband) stays in her (or his) state. For example, πEO,UE is set to zero,
and this probability is added to πEO,UO. An alternative would be to replace πEO,UE not with
zero but with πEO,EE. This alternative assumes that some women move from O to E even
if their husbands stay employed and considers transition beyond that as part of the AWE.















OU |UU = π
g
OU |EE.
If an AWE transition is smaller than the alternative transition (e.g. πgOE|EU ≤ π
g
OE|EE), we
keep the original value intact.
To make sure the alternative matrix is a transition matrix, i.e. all the rows should sum up
to one, we move the difference between the original and the alternative value to the transition
in which husband/wife looses the job or stays unemployed, but his/her partner stays out of

























OU |UU − π
g
OU |EE)
This specification gives us smaller numbers for AWE. However, as Table D.1 and Figure D.1
show, qualitatively the results are very similar to our main specification.
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Table D.1: Added Worker Effect, Individuals
(Alternative Specification)
1977-2017 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2017
All
Participation Rate 1.43 1.32 1.31 1.73 1.58
Employment Rate 1.34 1.30 1.30 1.64 1.31
Unemployment Rate 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.24
Males
Participation Rate 0.73 0.48 0.74 0.94 0.92
Employment Rate 0.72 0.68 0.79 0.90 0.63
Unemployment Rate -0.01 -0.23 -0.07 0.01 0.28
Females
Participation Rate 2.12 2.13 1.84 2.54 2.24
Employment Rate 1.96 1.91 1.79 2.42 2.03
Unemployment Rate 0.12 0.20 -0.01 0.04 0.16
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent differences between
the means of the data and the counterfactual experiment calculations (in which the added worker effect is shut down)
in percentage points, for different time periods. In the upper panel we shut down all transitions mentioned below (the
added worker effect for males and females). In the middle panel we shut down transitions corresponding to males’ added
worker effect: OE to EU , OU to EU , OE to UU , and OU to UU . In the lower panel we shut down the joint transitions,
corresponding to females’ added worker effect: EO to UE, UO to UE, EO to UU , and UO to UU .
Figure D.1: Added Worker Effect, Households
(Alternative Specification)
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Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. In the panel D.1a, the solid line represents the share
of households with two non-employed members. The dashed line represent the results of counterfactual experiments in
which we shut down the “classic” added-worker effect in the economy. In the panel D.1b, the solid line represents cyclical
component of men’s employment, the dashed line represents the cyclical component of women’s employment, and the
dotted line represents the cyclical component of the counterfactual women’s employment rate in the economy with the
added worker effect shut down. Monthly series smoothed using a 12-month moving average, adjusted for classification
errors, corrected for time aggregation bias, HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter 1600 and presented averaged across
quarters. Grey areas represent NBER recession periods.
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Table D.2: AWE, Volatility and Skewness
(Alternative Specification)
Cyclical Skewness Skewness
Volatility Volatility SD/SDGDP in levels in growth rates
Men
Participation 0.11 0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.18
[0.516] [ 0.338 ]
Employment 0.64 0.48 0.41 -0.61 -1.21
[0.002] [ 0.000 ]
Unemployment 0.62 0.48 0.40 0.81 1.33
[0.000] [ 0.000 ]
Women
Participation 0.24 0.02 0.16 -0.07 0.40
[0.717] [ 0.036 ]
Employment 0.43 0.25 0.27 -0.09 0.40
[0.634] [ 0.038 ]
Unemployment 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.49 0.64
[0.012] [ 0.001 ]
Without the added-worker effect
Women
Participation 0.55 0.11 0.35 0.21 -0.36
[0.252] [ 0.062 ]
Employment 0.69 0.32 0.44 -0.24 -0.40
[0.192] [ 0.038 ]
Unemployment 0.44 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.61
[0.085] [ 0.002 ]
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent
standard deviations of the cyclical component, standard deviation of the predicted values of labor market
states from the regression of cyclical component of labor state on cyclical component of log-GDP, ratios
of standard deviations of the cyclical component of labor market state and cyclical component of GDP,
skewness of cyclical component after HP-filtering ("in levels"), and skewness of the growth rates in the
data and in the counterfactual steady state of the economy without an added-worker effect. P-values
in brackets.
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Appendix E: Role of Changing Demographics
E.1 Does the Demographic Composition Matter for Labor Market
Outcomes?
In this section of the Appendix, we explore how changes in the US population’s demographic
composition between 1976 and 2018 affect our results. Between 1976 and 2018, the US pop-
ulation changed significantly along several dimensions. We focus on i) age, ii) race (share
of individuals of whites and non-whites), iii) geography (share of individuals living in dif-
ferent US states), iv) education (share of individuals with and without a college degree),
and v) presence of children (share of individuals with and without children). To capture the
effect of these demographic changes, we construct artificial populations where we keep the
demographic composition at its 1976-79 level.
To construct these artificial samples, we employ a simple matching algorithm.16 For each
month in the sample, we create bins for observable characteristics of households (age of
spouses, race, geography, education of spouses and the dummy for having children). There
are in total around 700 bins for age (age of husband 25-54 and age of wife 25-54 in different
combinations), 2 for the race (white vs. non-white), 51 for geography (the number of US
states), 4 for education (college vs. non-college for husbands and wives) and 2 for the dummy
of having children (0 vs. 1). We then compare the number of observations in these bins with
the number of observations in the same bins in the base period (1976-1979).17 If there
hadn’t been any change in the composition of the US population along these dimensions, the
number of observations in each bin would be constant. Suppose there are more observations
in a particular bin in the base-period than in the current one. Then, we perform a bootstrap-
like replacement of observations in the current period with observations in the base period at
random to equate the number of observations. In contrast, if there are more observations in
16See Angrist (1998) for details on matching.
17Due to change in CPS methodology of recording the number of children in the household in 1982, we use
1982-1985 as base years for the sample on children composition.
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the current period than in the base period for a bin, we erase observations from the current
period at random. We also record the transition of households in these bins between two
consecutive months.
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Figures E.1 - E.5 show the individual labor market outcomes (P , E, and U) for the
original and artificial data. Changes in the population’s composition in age, race, geography,
and presence of children do not affect these labor market outcomes. On the other hand,
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the current period than in the base period for a bin, we erase observations from the current
period at random. We also record the transitions of households in these bins between two
consecutive months.
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Figures E.1 - E.5 show the individual labor market outcomes (P , E, and U) for the
original and artificial data. Changes in the population’s composition in age, race, geography,
and presence of children do not affect these labor market outcomes. On the other hand,
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changes in the educational attainment do. If the US population’s educational attainment
remained constant, i.e., there was no increase in the fraction of the US population with a
college degree, participation and employment would be much lower. This is true for both
males and females. Given the importance of education, in Section E.2 we document how the
US population changes along educational attainment affect our results.


















































































































































1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Original Race Constant
45
the current period than in the base period for a bin, we erase observations from the current
period at random. We also record the transitions of households in these bins between two
consecutive months.


















































































































































1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Original Age Constant
Figures E.1 - E.5 show the individual labor market outcomes (P , E, and U) for the
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changes in the educational attainment do. If the US population’s educational attainment
remained constant, i.e., there was no increase in the fraction of the US population with a
college degree, participation and employment would be much lower. This is true for both
males and females. Given the importance of education, in Section E.2 we document how the
US population changes along educational attainment affect our results.
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E.2 The Added Worker Effect Keeping Educational Composition
Constant
In this section we keep the educational composition of households constant and recalculate
the results presented in the main text in Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1.
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Table E.1: Added Worker Effect, Individuals
(educational composition constant)
1977-2017 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2017
All
Participation Rate 2.32 1.97 2.03 2.66 2.79
Employment Rate 2.16 1.91 1.98 2.46 2.44
Unemployment Rate 0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.25
Males
Participation Rate 1.25 0.84 1.22 1.41 1.69
Employment Rate 1.20 1.03 1.22 1.30 1.32
Unemployment Rate 0.00 -0.24 -0.05 0.05 0.32
Females
Participation Rate 3.36 3.04 2.73 3.96 3.94
Employment Rate 3.13 2.75 2.64 3.72 3.66
Unemployment Rate 0.12 0.23 -0.01 0.09 0.10
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent differences between
the means of the data and the counterfactual experiment calculations (in which the added worker effect is shut down)
in percentage points, for different time periods. In the upper panel we shut down all transitions mentioned below (the
added worker effect for males and females). In the middle panel we shut down transitions corresponding to males’ added
worker effect: OE to EU , OU to EU , OE to UU , and OU to UU . In the lower panel we shut down the joint transitions,
corresponding to females’ added worker effect: EO to UE, UO to UE, EO to UU , and UO to UU .
Figure E.6: Added Worker Effect, Households
(educational composition constant)
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Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. In the panel E.6a, the solid line represents the share of
households with two non-employed members. The dashed line represent the results of counterfactual experiments in which
we shut down added-worker effect in the economy. In the panel E.6b, the solid line represents cyclical component of men’s
employment, the dashed line represents the cyclical component of women’s employment, and the dotted line represents
the cyclical component of the counterfactual women’s employment rate in the economy with the added worker effect
shut down. Monthly series smoothed using a 12-month moving average, adjusted for classification errors, corrected for
time aggregation bias, HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter 1600 and presented averaged across quarters. Grey areas
represent NBER recession periods.
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The results are qualitatively similar to the original ones, although in the absence of changes in
educational attainment we find higher levels of the AWE for all labor market outcomes except
for women’s unemployment. In absence of educational changes, the result that women’s
employment would look like men’s in terms of volatility and skewness is preserved.
Table E.2: Added Worker Effect, Volatility and Skewness
(educational composition constant)
Cyclical Skewness Skewness
Volatility Volatility SD/SDGDP in levels in growth rates
Men
Participation 0.17 0.03 0.11 -0.62 0.08
[0.003] [ 0.660 ]
Employment 0.71 0.56 0.45 -0.43 -1.18
[0.031] [ 0.000 ]
Unemployment 0.71 0.56 0.45 0.69 1.42
[0.001] [ 0.000 ]
Women
Participation 0.30 0.04 0.19 -1.10 -0.03
[0.000] [ 0.880 ]
Employment 0.42 0.23 0.27 -0.13 0.24
[0.491] [ 0.208 ]
Unemployment 0.51 0.40 0.33 0.19 0.80
[0.335] [ 0.000 ]
Without the added-worker effect
Women
Participation 0.95 0.06 0.61 -0.75 -0.77
[0.000] [ 0.000 ]
Employment 1.01 0.17 0.64 -0.49 -0.54
[0.015] [ 0.008 ]
Unemployment 0.48 0.35 0.30 -0.04 0.43
[0.822] [ 0.032 ]
Note: CPS 1977:Q2 to 2017:Q3. All individuals aged 25-54. The numbers in the table represent
standard deviations of the cyclical component, standard deviation of the predicted values of labor market
states from the regression of cyclical component of labor state on cyclical component of log-GDP, ratios
of standard deviations of the cyclical component of labor market state and cyclical component of GDP,
skewness of cyclical component after HP-filtering ("in levels"), and skewness of the growth rates in the
data and in the counterfactual steady state of the economy without an added-worker effect. P-values
in brackets.
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